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INTRODUCTION
1

In Sell v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Constitution allows the government to administer
antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal detainee in
order to render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious,
2
but nonviolent crimes.
Drawing closely from the standards
3
articulated in the earlier cases of Washington v. Harper and Riggins v.
4
5
Nevada, the six-justice majority in Sell drew a four-part test for
determining when the government may constitutionally involuntarily
administer antipsychotic drugs to detainees for trial competency
purposes when they are on trial for non-violent crimes, and have not
6
been dangerous in the prison context. Specifically, the Court held:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the [(1)] treatment is
medically appropriate, [(2)] is substantially unlikely to have side
effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, [(3)] less
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same
results, and the treatment is [(4)] necessary . . . to further
7
important governmental trial-related interests.
∗
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539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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Id. at 169.
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539 U.S. at 179.
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Id. at 169.
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In doing so, however, the Court suggested that lower courts
should first consider whether involuntary medication is permissible
8
on the ground that the detainee is dangerous. Alternatively, if the
detainee is not dangerous, as a last resort, the Court maintains that
the government could still involuntarily medicate these pre-trial
9
detainees under the Sell standard. This Comment argues that this
suggestion is problematic, for it leaves dangerous pre-trial detainees
10
with little of the Sixth Amendment protections that the Sell four-part
test provides non-violent detainees.
What the Sell Court overlooked is that the Harper standard,
which applies to violent inmates, was created for post-conviction prison
inmates, where Sixth Amendment fair trial protections are not
implicated. By contrast, individuals like the detainees in Sell and
Riggins are pre-trial detainees, which means that Sixth Amendment
trial protections should apply. The Sell standard properly takes Sixth
Amendment concerns into account, whereas Harper does not. The
Sell Court, therefore, was wrong to instruct governments to attempt to
involuntarily medicate pre-trial detainees under Harper because their
Sixth Amendment rights will be ignored, and pre-trial detainees will
be left to suffer antipsychotic drugs’ side effects that may alter the
detainee’s demeanor and personality in ways that can prejudice facets
11
of his defense.
Part I of this comment discusses the pre-existing standards in
this area of law prior to Sell, focusing on the “dangerousness” test of
Washington v. Harper and the trial competence test highlighted in
Riggins v. Nevada. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sell v. United States, paying special attention to the nuances between
the different courts’ decisions throughout the case’s procedural
history.
Among other things, Part III provides a discussion of the Sixth
Amendment issues implicated in this situation, focusing primarily on
the right to a fair trial, competency, courtroom appearance and
8

Id. at 182-83.
539 U.S. at 182-83.
10
The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9
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demeanor, and their effects on jury deliberations. This section lays
the groundwork for how the side effects of these antipsychotic drugs
implicate Sixth Amendment concerns. Further, Part III broadly
discusses different regimens of antipsychotic drugs similar to those
being implemented to patients suffering illnesses comparable to
Charles Sell, their impact on the body, their curative tendencies, and
the brutal side effects that oftentimes result.
Lastly, Part III discusses the problem with Sell. Although the Sell
four-part test properly addresses the side effects of antipsychotic
drugs and their oftentimes prejudicial impact on detainees’ Sixth
Amendment concerns, the Court’s accompanying instructions on the
test’s application are flawed. The Sell Court should have limited
Harper’s application to dangerous, post-conviction inmates only and
should have instructed courts to apply the Sell standard to all pre-trial
detainees. Only then can all pre-trial detainees be guaranteed to
have their Sixth Amendment trial rights weighed against the
oftentimes devastating side effects of the drugs the government is
attempting to forcefully administer to them. To instruct otherwise, as
the Sell Court has done, deprives individuals of their constitutional
rights in favor of achieving an unfair conviction.
I.

PRE-EXISTING PRECEDENT FOR SELL:
WASHINGTON V. HARPER AND RIGGINS V. NEVADA
In Sell, the Supreme Court seemingly combined the rationale
12
13
utilized in the Harper and Riggins decisions for determining when
the government can involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to
detainees, who are not dangerous in the prison environment, for trial
14
competency purposes for non-violent crimes.
A brief analysis of
those two cases follows.
A. Washington v. Harper
15

In 1976, Walter Harper was sentenced to prison for robbery.
Harper was mentally ill and, while incarcerated, was administered
16
antipsychotic drugs like Melaril. He was granted parole in 1980,
17
conditioned upon his participation in psychiatric treatment.
12

494 U.S. at 210.
504 U.S. at 127.
14
Sell, 538 U.S. at 177-79 (“Two prior precedents, Harper . . . and Riggins . . . set
forth the framework for determining the legal answer.”).
15
Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
16
Id. at 213-14 n.1.
17
Id.
13
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Through 1981, he continued to receive psychiatric treatment until he
18
assaulted two hospital nurses, and his parole was revoked. In 1982,
after voluntarily receiving antipsychotic drugs for many years, Harper
19
refused to continue taking the prescribed medications. Thereafter,
according to procedure, the treating physician sought to medicate
20
Harper over his objections.
Harper filed suit claiming the
institution’s policy to involuntarily administer the medication violated
the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses of both
21
the Federal and State constitutions. After seven years of hearings
22
and appeals, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In Harper, the Court held that even though individuals have a
“significant” constitutionally protected “liberty interest” in “avoiding
23
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,” where the
inmate is “dangerous” and based on the nature of the prison
24
environment, states have a legitimate and important interest in
25
forced medication.
Further, the Court stated, the Due Process Clause allows a prison
inmate suffering from serious mental illness to be involuntary treated
with antipsychotic drugs, “[(1)] if the inmate is dangerous to himself
or others and [(2)] the treatment is in the inmate’s medical
26
interest.” The Harper Court’s reasoning, which first recognized a
constitutionally protected interest in the right to refuse medical
27
treatment, revolved around such factors as Harper already being
convicted and him being dangerous to inmates and staff because of a
28
mental illness.

18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Harper, 494 U.S. at 217.
22
Id. at 218.
23
Id. at 221. In Harper, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that
there is a constitutionally protected interest in the right to refuse medical treatment.
Id. at 221-22.
24
Id. at 227.
25
Id. at 225.
26
Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
27
Id. at 221-22.
28
See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right
to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 417 (1992). Harper claimed the extent
of a prisoner’s right to refuse “must be defined in the context of the inmate’s
confinement.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 222.
19
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B. Riggins v. Nevada
Unlike in Harper, where the convicted inmate was dangerous in
29
the prison context, in Riggins, the defendant was a pre-trial detainee.
Riggins was awaiting trial for a violent crime—he had allegedly
30
stabbed his victim repeatedly to death —and since Riggins suffered
from mental illness, the government requested he be treated with
31
Melaril for trial competency purposes. The State, relying on Nevada
Revised Statute § 178.400 (1989), which allowed involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs for trial competence purposes,
32
put Riggins on trial.
Riggins then moved to terminate the
administration of the drugs, arguing the drugs “denied him the
ability to assist in his own defense and prejudicially affected his
attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial,” and without the
medication, Riggins would be incompetent, and therefore could not
33
In a one-page decision, giving no indication of the
stand trial.
court’s rationale, the trial court denied the motion and subsequently,
the State administered the drugs, Riggins was convicted, and
34
sentenced to death.
In Riggins, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs during a detainee’s
35
trial violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the
Court overturned Riggins’ conviction because the “district court
allowed administration of Melaril to continue without making . . . any
36
findings,” the Court stated it would have allowed the involuntary
37
administration provided certain standards were followed.
The
Court stated that the “Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as
38
much protection to persons the State detains for trial,” and
although there exist no standards for judging involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs in trial and pre-trial situations,
the State “would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had
demonstrated . . . that treatment with antipsychotic medication was
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
29

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
Id. at 129.
31
Id. at 129-30.
32
Id. at 130.
33
Id. at 131.
34
Id. at 129-31. Subsequently, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins’
conviction and death sentence. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 132.
35
Id. at 132-33.
36
Id. at 136 (emphasis in original).
37
Id. at 135.
38
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
30
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essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”
Similarly, the Court added, the State “might have been able to
justify . . . involuntary [drug] treatment . . . by establishing that it
could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence” of
40
the murder charge “by using less intrusive means.”
II. SELL V. UNITED STATES

In Sell, the factual background presented a novel situation to the
Supreme Court—unlike Walter Harper, Charles Sell was not
dangerous in the prison context so a Harper analysis alone was
insufficient. Similarly, unlike David Riggins, Charles Sell was awaiting
trial for non-violent crimes so he did not fit neatly under the Court’s
Riggins standard. Thus, the Supreme Court needed to articulate a
new standard to address the concerns Charles Sell’s case presented—
a non-dangerous pre-trial detainee on trial for a non-violent crime.
A. Sell: Factual Summary and Procedural History
Sell, once a practicing dentist, had a long and unfortunate
history of mental illness and in 1982, “after telling doctors that the
gold he used for fillings had been contaminated by communists,” was
hospitalized for psychotic tendencies, treated, and subsequently
41
discharged. In 1984, Sell was hospitalized and again released after
calling and requesting the police to shoot a leopard that was
42
attempting to board a bus outside his office. Sell’s activity turned
criminal in 1997 when he was charged with submitting fictitious
insurance claims for payment, and shortly thereafter Sell and his wife
were charged with “56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of Medicaid
43
fraud, and 1 count of money laundering.” Then, at one point in
1998, Sell was charged with the attempted murder of his arresting FBI

39

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. Professor Cichon wrote in response to Riggins:
Although the majority refused to mandate substantive criteria in
Riggins, it did suggest a more rigorous standard of review for the
involuntary medication of pretrial detainees than that articulated in
Harper for convicted inmates. Rather than deferring to a rational state
interest as in Harper, the Court indicated that “safety considerations or
other compelling concerns” must be asserted in order to override a
pretrial detainee’s liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs.
Cichon, supra note 28, at 418-19.
41
Sell, 539 U.S. at 169-70 (quoting App. at 146).
42
Id. (citing App. at 148).
43
Id. (citing App. at 12-22). At this time, Sell was held competent to stand trial
by a federal magistrate judge, and was released on bail. Id. (quoting App. at 321).
40
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agent as well as a former co-worker who was planning to testify
44
against Sell in the fraud case.
In 1999, after being found incompetent to stand trial by the
magistrate, Sell moved for reconsideration and was ordered to be
sent to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners for up
45
to four months to receive hospitalized treatment. During this time,
the medical center staff recommended that Sell take antipsychotic
medication, and soon sought to administer the drugs against his
46
will. In August 2000, by court order, the magistrate authorized the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to Sell but stayed
47
the order allowing Sell to appeal the issue to the district court. In
April 2001, although not affirming the decision based on the
magistrate’s findings, the district court found the magistrate’s
“dangerousness” determination clearly erroneous, and affirmed the
48
use of the drugs for trial competency purposes.
Sell and the Government both appealed the district court’s
decision, and in March 2002, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
49
affirmed. A divided panel affirmed the district court, holding that
50
Sell was not dangerous, but declared that administering the drugs
involuntarily to ensure Sell’s competence to stand trial was lawful
because the “government has an essential interest in bringing a
51
defendant to trial,” and there were no less intrusive means to do so.
Moreover, a majority of the Eighth Circuit found antipsychotic drug
treatment “medically appropriate” for Sell and that with the drugs,
there was a reasonable probability that Sell could participate in his
52
trial.

44

Id. (citing App. at 23-29). The attempted murder charge was joined with the
fraud charges for trial. Id.
45
Sell, 539 U.S. at 170 (citing App. at 323).
46
Id. at 172 (citing App. at 323).
47
Id. at 173 (quoting App. at 333-34). The magistrate found that Sell was such a
danger to himself and others in the institution, that medication would be the only
way to render him less dangerous, so the new drugs will ameliorate side effects, the
drugs’ benefits outweigh the risks, and the drugs have a substantial probability of
returning Sell to competency. Id.
48
Id. at 173-74 (quoting App. at 349, 349 n.5, 354).
49
Sell, 539 U.S. at 173-74 (citing United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir.
2002)).
50
Sell, 282 F.3d at 565 (referring to an incident Sell had with a nurse at the
medical center, the Eight Circuit held his behavior at the medical center, at the
most, amounted to an “‘inappropriate familiarity and even infatuation’ with a
nurse”).
51
Id. at 568.
52
Sell, 539 U.S. at 174-75 (citing Sell, 282 F.3d at 571-72).
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The United States Supreme Court “granted certiorari to
determine whether the Eighth Circuit ‘erred in rejecting’ Sell’s
argument that ‘allowing the government to administer antipsychotic
medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand
trial for non-violent offenses,’ . . . improperly depriv[ed] Sell of an
53
important ‘liberty’ that the Constitution guarantees.” The six-justice
majority held that the Constitution authorizes the government to
administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal
detainee in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial
54
for serious, but non-violent crimes. Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, drew from Harper and Riggins a four-part test for
determining those instances in which the government can
involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to detainees for trial
competency purposes when they are not dangerous in the prison
55
context. The Court stated:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the [(1)] treatment is medically
appropriate, [(2)] is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, [(3)] less intrusive treatments
are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results, and the
treatment is [(4)] necessary . . . to further important governmental trial56
related interests.

Justice Breyer cautioned, however, that situations where the
government could utilize the standard “solely for trial competence
57
purposes . . . may be rare.”
The first element requires a court to find “that important
58
governmental interests are at stake.” Under this prong, the Court
recognized the existence of an important governmental interest in
bringing an individual, whether being accused of a serious crime
59
against the person or property, to trial. The Court declared that
lower courts must engage in case-by-case factual determinations in
evaluating the government’s interest because certain circumstances
53

Id. at 175 (quoting Petitioner’s Brief at I, Sell (No. 02-5664); U.S. CONST.
amend. V) (citations omitted).
54
Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.
55
Id. at 178-79.
56
Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
57
Id. at 180.
58
Id. (emphasis in original).
59
Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-36) (“In both instances the Government
seeks to protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for
security.”).
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may lessen the importance of the interest in bringing the detainee to
60
trial. For example, the interest in bringing the defendant to trial
might be lessened in situations where civil commitment is an
61
alternative option to incarceration without a criminal trial. Justice
Breyer warned the “potential for future confinement affects, but does
62
not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution.”
The Court, however, warned, the “Government has a concomitant,
constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial
63
is a fair one.”
During step two of the analysis, the “court must conclude that
involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant
64
Here, the court is required to
state interests,” of prong one.
determine that the antipsychotic “drugs . . . [are] substantially likely
to render the defendant competent to stand trial” as well as find that
the medication(s) are “substantially unlikely to have side effects that will
interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in
65
conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair.” In
this step, the majority cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins,
voicing the Sixth Amendment concerns of presentation in the
courtroomlike in-court demeanor, behavior, manner, facial
66
expressions, emotional responses, and their impression on the jury.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy discussed how antipsychotic drugs
prejudice the defendant by rendering him unable, and sometimes
67
too lethargic, to assist counsel in his defense.
Step three requires the court to “conclude that involuntary
68
medication is necessary to further those [state] interests.” In other
words, the court must conclude “that any alternative, less intrusive
treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results . . . ,”
60

Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
Id. (“The defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily . . . may mean lengthy
confinement in an institution for the mentally ill . . . [that] would diminish the risks
that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a
serious crime. We do not mean to suggest that civil commitment is a substitute for a
criminal trial. The Government has a substantial interest in timely prosecution.”).
62
Id. (“The same is true of the possibility that the defendant has already been
confined for a significant amount of time (for which he would receive credit toward
any sentence ultimately imposed, see 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)).”).
63
Id. at 181.
64
Id. (emphasis added).
65
Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (emphasis
added).
66
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
67
Id.
68
Id.
61
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including, “less intrusive means for administering the drugs, e.g., a
court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before
69
considering more intrusive methods.”
Last, in step four, the “court must conclude that administration
70
of the drugs is medically appropriate” for the detainees’ situation. The
Court noted that antipsychotic drugs may have differing success rates
and may cause different side effects, so within this prong, the
medication must be “in the patient’s best medical interest in light of
71
his medical condition,” and also, the “specific kinds of drugs at issue
72
may matter here as elsewhere.”
In terms of application, the Court noted that the Sell four-part
test only deals with the competency to stand trial and suggested that
courts need not consider these factors when the individual’s
73
dangerousness is the issue, like in Harper. The Court stated that
employing Sell protections should be used as a last resort, claiming,
“[t]here are often strong reasons for a court to determine whether
forced administration of drugs can be justified on these alternative
74
grounds before turning to the [Sell] question,” and moreover, Justice
Breyer stated, the dangerousness test is usually more “objective and
manageable . . . [and] a court . . . should ordinarily determine
whether the Government [seeks or has first sought] permission for
forced administration of drugs on these other Harper-type grounds;
75
and, if not, why not.” Further, he stated, the “need to consider
69

Id. (emphasis added). In this prong, the majority cites the Amicus Curiae Brief
for the American Psychological Association that states, “nondrug therapies may be
effective in restoring psychotic defendants to competence.” Id. The Court also cites
the Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association that states,
“alternative treatments for psychosis commonly not as effective as medication,” which
contrasts the American Psychological Association brief. Id.
70
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (emphasis in original).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 181.
73
Id. at 181-82.
74
Id. (emphasis in original).
75
Sell, 539 U.S. at 182-83 (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140). Under the less
protective Harper standard, the state can medicate a detainee against his will if 1) the
inmate displays an amount of “dangerousness” to himself or others and, 2) the
treatment is within the medical interest of the inmate. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. Sell
offers substantially more protection to the detainees, requiring the court to find that
1) important governmental interests are at stake, 2) the medication will significantly
further those interests, 3) involuntary medication is necessary to further those
interests, and 4) the administration of the drugs must be medically appropriate for
the patient. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)). The Sell court cited Justice Kennedy’s Riggins concurrence incorrectly
in this context. Kennedy did not suggest that alternative means to involuntarily
administer the drugs should be employed first before a Sell-like inquiry. In Riggins,
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authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear” if
the Court were to authorize the medication on “alternative
76
grounds,” and the “medical experts may find it easier to provide an
informed opinion about whether, given the risk of side effects,
particular drugs are medically appropriate and necessary to control a
patient’s potentially dangerous behavior . . . than to try to balance
harms and benefits related to the more quintessentially legal
77
questions of trial fairness and competence.”
B. Standard Applied to Charles Sell: The Decision
Sell’s administrative Medical Center hearing and the federal
magistrate’s hearing approved the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs to Sell on the Harper “dangerousness” grounds
78
alone. In contrast, the district court and the Eighth Circuit found
the court’s application of the “dangerousness” standard clearly
erroneous, adopting a Riggins rationale, and agreed that the drugs
could be administered solely to render Sell competent enough to
79
stand trial even though he was not dangerous to himself or others.
Although the Supreme Court voiced its discomfort with the Eighth
Circuit’s conclusion that Sell was not “dangerous,” the Supreme
Court assumed the Eighth Circuit’s decision was correct because the
80
Government did not contest the matter on appeal.
he simply made reference to the distinction between the two sets of inquiries and
how they both fit certain circumstances. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“This is not a case like [Harper], in which the purpose of the
involuntary medication was to ensure that the incarcerated person ceased to be a
physical danger to himself or others. The inquiry in that context is both objective
and manageable. Here, [in Riggins] the purpose of the medication is not merely to
treat a person with grave psychiatric disorders and enable that person to function
and behave in a way not dangerous to himself or others, but rather to render the
person competent to stand trial.”).
76
Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.
77
Id. at 182. Even further in this vain, according to the majority, the Court
would prefer to remove this whole inquiry away from the criminal realm and into the
civil realm when possible. Justice Breyer suggests that the Harper inquiry is equated
with “medical treatment as a civil matter” and every state provides avenues through
which the involuntary administration of medication can be authorized, and if a court
were to authorize “medication on these alternative grounds, the need to consider
authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear.” Id. at 182-83
(citing 28 CFR § 549.43 (2002); ALA. CODE §§ 26-2A-102(a), 26-2A-105, 26-2A-108
(Michie 1992); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.105(a), 13.26.116(b) (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-5303, 14-5312 (West 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-65-205, 28-65-301
(1987)).
78
Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.
79
Id. at 184.
80
Id. at 184 (“If anything, the record before us, described in Part I, suggests the
contrary.”).
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The Supreme Court held that although it could have approved
the antipsychotic drugs for trial competency purposes if it met the
new Sell standard, the Eighth Circuit incorrectly approved the
administration of drugs to Sell because the government failed to
81
meet that standard.
The Court was concerned with the lack of
breadth of the discussion at the federal magistrate’s hearing, which
focused mostly on Sell’s “dangerousness,” and left unmentioned most
82
of the factors articulated in the new four-part test. Moreover, the
Supreme Court noted as problematic the hearing record’s absence of
meaningful discussion about the drugs’ side effects, the drugs’
adverse effects on communication with counsel, the drugs’ chances of
sedating the defendant, and the drugs’ impact on quelling detainees’
expressive emotions after courtroom trial developments, stating these
concerns tend to undermine the fairness of trial and are all
83
considerations under the new Sell standard. Additionally, the Court
questioned why the lower court did not address the fact that Sell
would not be a threat to the community because he had already been
confined at the Medical Center and will continue to be held there if
84
he does not take the medication. For these reasons, the majority
vacated and remanded the Eighth Circuit’s judgment so the
government could pursue forced medication on either the Sell
85
articulated factors, the Harper dangerousness grounds, or both.
81

Id. at 185.
Id. at 185.
83
Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
84
Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.
85
Id. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and O’Connor dissented,
primarily disagreeing with the majority’s finding that the issue on appeal falls within
the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 186-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did
not believe there was a final judgment, and because of this, the Court of Appeals
should not have heard the appeal. Id. The dissent claimed Sell’s pretrial order did
not fit neatly under the collateral order doctrine test because the issue failed element
three which is: “‘(3) effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Id.
at 189 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468). Justice
Scalia determined that Sell’s “order is reviewable on appeal from conviction and
sentence,” and therefore the petitioner will have to wait until after the final
judgment to appeal a “postdeprivation vacatur of conviction” as opposed to a
“predeprivation injunction.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 189-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Calling it
a “breathtaking expansion of appellate jurisdiction over collateral orders,” Justice
Scalia warned that the majority’s decision seemingly will allow criminal defendants to
engage in opportunistic behavior by allowing them to refuse their medication
halfway through their trial, and demanding “an interlocutory appeal from the order
that medication continue on a compulsory basis.” Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Further, Justice Scalia believed the correct procedural avenue Sell should have taken
would have been to obtain a “pre-trial review of the . . . medication order by filing
suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq.,” or by filing a
Bivens “action, which is available to federal pretrial detainees challenging the
82

2005

COMMENT

1111

III. SELL ESSENTIALLY INSTRUCTS LOWER COURTS TO IGNORE
DETAINEES’ SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
A. Competence, the Constitution, and Involuntary Medication to
Render Competence
It is a common thread of American jurisprudence that the
86
conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process.
Incompetency, or insufficient mental capacity, has been defined as
whether or not the defendant could rationally consult with counsel
and whether or not he rationally and factually understands the
87
proceedings. A competency determination alone is not sufficient to
guard against an unfair trial, but competency is necessary “because
the elements of a fair trial presuppose, and depend upon, mental
88
competence.”
Obviously, the government has a constitutional
requirement to render criminal detainees competent to stand trial
and the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to
89
detainees for that purpose raises many Sixth Amendment concerns.
Generally, the Sixth Amendment ensures that defendants in
criminal prosecutions “be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
90
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The Supreme Court has
conditions of their confinement . . . .” Id. at 193 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
86
See Vickie L. Feeman, Note, Reassessing Forced Medication of Criminal Defendants
in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 35 B.C. L. REV. 681, 704 (1994) (citing Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
87
Id.
88
William P. Ziegelmueller, Supreme Court Review: Sixth Amendment-Due Process on
Drugs: The Implications of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial Detainees With Antipsychotic Drugs:
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 836, 846
(1993).
89
See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The side effects of
antipsychotic drugs may alter demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the
defense. Serious due process concerns are implicated when the State manipulates
the evidence in this way.”).
90
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also M. Catherine Healy, Comment, Riggins v.
Nevada: Are “Synthetically Sane” Criminal Defendants Competent to Stand Trial?,” 20 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 385, 407 (1994). These Sixth Amendment
rights have been incorporated to state courts through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment thus further providing, “the fundamental elements of
fairness in a criminal trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Healy, supra note 90, at
408 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (announcing “because
these rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, they are part of the
‘due process of law’ [sic] that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
defendants in the criminal courts of the States”)).
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held that one “accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or
innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced
at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at
91
trial.” Along this rationale, the Court held that a defendant may be
92
prejudiced if he appears before a jury bound and gagged. Similarly,
93
in Estelle v. Williams, the Court held that a state cannot require
94
defendants to be tried while wearing prison uniforms.
The drugs’ effect on a detainee’s in-court demeanor is a major
concern; a defendant on drugs, who appears in a trance-like state or
is suffering from spastic body movements like lip smacking and
95
involuntary pelvic movements will likely have a prejudicial effect on
the jury.
Commentators maintain that frequent use of the
antipsychotic drug Mellaril makes defendants “stoned for all practical
96
purposes and [they] can barely function.”
Along these lines, the Supreme Court has held that if a
defendant cannot actively cooperate with his lawyer, the defendant’s
97
right to effective assistance of counsel has been compromised. A
defendant has the right to provide advice to his counsel about his
defense and it is within his rights “to supercede his lawyer altogether
98
and conduct the trial himself.”
Naturally, in order for the
defendant to make decisions about these rights, and assist in his
defense, he must be competent and not under the influence of
91

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (“Not only is it possible that the sight
of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the
defendant, but the use of this technique is itself something of [an] affront to the very
dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”).
In certain extreme situations though, the Court noted, “binding and gagging might
possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way to handle” a disruptive defendant.
Id.
93
425 U.S. 501 (1976).
94
Id. at 504-05 (stating no “essential state policy” was served by compelling the
defendant’s dress, the Court said, “[t]he actual impact of a particular practice on the
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined,” so courts “must do the best
they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure, based on reason,
principle, and common human experience”).
95
See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
96
See Elizabeth A. Schmidtlein, Note, Riggins v. Nevada: The Accused’s Right to
“Just Say No” to Antipsychotic Drugs?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 541, 544
(1994) (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting doctor
who examined Riggins at his competency hearing).
97
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80 (1976).
98
See Ziegelmueller, supra note 88, at 846 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 816 (1975) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934))).
92
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debilitating drugs so he can understand the nature of the
99
proceedings that surround him.
Clearly these Sixth Amendment concerns are implicated when
defendants are under the influence of antipsychotic drugs. When
patients undergo antipsychotic treatment, their personalities change
dramaticallyoverwrought patients become lethargic, emotional
outbursts cease as the “synthetically sane” patient enters a zombie-like
100
trance.
Commentators state that this “exercise of ‘duress on [a]
witness’ mind [so] as to preclude him from making a free and
voluntary choice’ regarding his testimony is an infringement on a
101
defendant’s right to a fair trial.”
B. Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs
It is important to discuss different antipsychotic drugs and the
problematic tendencies that oftentimes result from their
administration.
Psychotropic drugs, including antipsychotics,
tranquilizers, sedatives, and hypnotics, affect the mental processes by
altering an individual’s brain chemical balance, which hopefully
102
affects the cognitive process in a remedial way.
Although the
medical world does not fully understand how the drugs combat
psychosis, it is believed that the drugs manipulate dopamine levels
103
produced in the brain.
There is no agreement on what mental
104
conditions are best treated by drugs, but it is agreed that the drugs
only suppress, and do not cure mental illness, and that they provide
105
no curative effect once they leave the blood stream.
Antipsychotics’ “effectiveness varies from condition to condition,
symptom to symptom and patient to patient,” and because of this,
psychiatrists face difficulty prescribing medications due to the
106
inability to predict the drugs’ effect on a particular patient.
A
medication regimen, therefore, is usually prescribed based on custom
107
within the profession, rather than through calculated analysis.
99

See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-73 (1975).
See Feeman, supra note 86, at 699.
101
See Ziegelmueller, supra note 88, at 846-47 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI);
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972).
102
See William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection
for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 945 (1998).
103
Id.
104
See Feeman, supra note 86, at 698.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. (citing Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients’ Right to
Refuse Treatment, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 461, 461 (1977); Lawrence D. Gaughan & Lewis
100
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Moreover, the patient’s appropriate dosage is a product of guesswork
and trial and error with the administered amount increased until
108
either there is a curative effect or toxic symptoms develop.
Even
then, any curative effect may be temporary because individuals’ drug
109
responses vary over time, and when side effects present themselves,
110
they sometimes persist for years after the medication is stopped.
Some common side effects of antipsychotic drugs are
pronounced sedation, a condition occurring after the drugs
chemically dull patients’ thought processes and flatten their
111
emotional responses.
Personalities change dramatically as a result
of the medications; overwrought patients become lethargic, and
emotional outbursts cease as the “synthetically sane” patient enters a
112
zombie-like trance.
This “chemical lobotomy,” a term coined by
opponents of the drugs, forces patients to feel drowsy, disoriented,
113
and unable to stay awake.
Generally, the side effects can be
characterized into two groups: extrapyramidal and non-neurological
114
symptoms.
Within the extrapyramidal symptoms category, most of the
disorders are extremely harmful, involving the medications’ effect on
the brain’s extrapyramidal system, which is the part of the body’s
involuntary nervous system that directs coordination of muscular
115
movements. This classification contains five main disorders: tardive
dyskinesia, parkinsonism, akathisia, dystonic reactions, and
116
neuroleptic malignant syndrome.

H. La Rue, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 47 (1978)).
108
See Feeman, supra note 86, at 698.
109
Id. at 699.
110
Id. at 700.
111
Id. at 699.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See Cichon, supra note 28, at 297-301; see also Brooks, supra note 102, at 94751. Not all the side effects fit neatly into these two categories. For example, there
are many other minor side effects of antipsychotic drugs like blurred vision, dry
mouth, and minor interference with sexual functioning. Id. at 950. Additionally,
constipation, urinary retention, and eye and severe skin disorders, including major
discoloration, have been noted. See Schmidtlein, supra note 96, at 545. Certain
behavioral impairments have been noted to occur such as toxic confusion, insomnia,
schizophrenic symptoms, and bizarre dreams. Id. It is easy to see how many of these
behaviors and grotesque movements are embarrassing for the patient and the family
to endure. See Feeman, supra note 86, at 700.
115
See Cichon, supra note 28, at 300.
116
Id.
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Tardive dyskinesia, the most damaging disorder, is an
unpredictable, irreversible disorder that involves spastic body
movements, ranging from lip smacking and involuntary pelvic
117
movements, to difficulty in breathing, talking, and swallowing.
Parkinsonism’s victims resemble someone afflicted with Parkinson’s
disease, showing a “‘mask-like face, drooling, muscle stiffness and
118
rigidity.’”
Akinesia, which is a subcategory of parkinsonism, is a
socially debilitating side effect whose victims seem lethargic to the
point that any intellectual interests, like communication and reading,
119
become impossible.
Akathisia, a disorder exhibiting symptoms
including painful irritability, pacing, fidgeting, and the constant
tapping of the feet is problematic in that patients reach such a point
of extreme panic that it oftentimes displays symptoms worse than the
120
underlying illness.
Dystonic reactions, characterized by muscular
117

See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948-49; see also Feeman, supra note 86, at 700.
Antipsychotic drugs oftentimes mask the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia—these
symptoms may not expose themselves until the regimen is decreased or discontinued
which is why doctors fail to diagnose this disorder almost ninety percent of the time.
See Brooks, supra note 102, at 949 (quoting Kenneth A. Kessler & Jeremy Waletzky,
Clinical Use of Antipsychotic, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 202, 205 (1981)). Studies indicate
the prevalence of tardive dyskinesia approximately range from ten to fifty percent;
the federal judiciary is also in disagreement but the Supreme Court in Harper has
indicated the incidence of the disorder at ten to twenty-five percent while district
courts, for example, Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), have held the
number as high as fifty-six percent. See Brooks, supra note 102, at 949-50 (citing
Rogers, 478 F. Supp. 1342; Harper, 494 U.S. 210).
118
See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948 (quoting Plotkin, supra note 107, at 475).
Prevalence rates of parkinsonism are difficult to determine— studies have indicated
that five to ninety percent of patients suffer from the disorder. Id.
119
See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948; see also Cichon, supra note 28, at 301.
Doctors note difficulty in diagnosing this disorder, mostly because the patient’s
peaceful, apathetic state masks discomfort to the point where they will actually deny
difficulties. Around thirty-five percent on certain medications develop akinesia and
anti-parkinsonian drugs assist, but usually will never offer curative effects to the
disorder. See Cichon, supra note 28, at 301.
120
See Cichon, supra note 28, at 301-02. Akathisia, which has been linked to
suicidal and homicidal behavior, is difficult to diagnose and the prevalence of the
side effect is staggering. Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 102, at 947-48 (stating that
“[p]sychiatrists often fail to diagnose akathesia as it may be impossible to distinguish
between akathesia and psychotic excitement.
Because psychiatrists often
misinterpret symptoms of akathesia as a worsening of a patient’s psychiatric
condition, physicians will react by increasing the dosage level of medication.”).
Further,
[o]ne early study found that forty-five percent of the patients observed
experienced akathisia at one time or another. A more recent study,
however, indicates a much higher prevalence rate. After only one five
milligram dose of haloperidol, sixty-four percent of the test group
experienced akathisia, with twenty-two percent suffering a severe case.
At the end of one week of treatment with a daily ten milligram dose,
seventy-six percent of the patients experienced the impairment. Sixty-
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spasms in the eyes, face, neck, and arms are severe short-term side
effects, and most likely, these horrible symptoms would be present
121
during the detainee’s trial.
The last side effect within the
extrapyramidal class is neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which
produces symptoms ranging from elevated blood pressure, delirium,
122
mutism, and in some cases, to coma.
The second group of characterized side effects is the nonneurological disorders, which mostly involve sexual dysfunctions,
123
In males, sexual
blood, endocrine, and hormonal disorders.
dysfunctions have ranged from impotence, inability to ejaculate, or to
124
the more severe reversal of ejaculation into the bladder.
Also,
induced priapism can result, which is a sustained erection that occurs
125
without stimulation. The erection, which is extremely painful, does
126
not subside, oftentimes requiring emergency surgery.
Endocrine
and hormonal disorders have also been reported as non-neurological
side effects, some including an increased appetite that leads to
127
substantial weight gain. Females have been reported to experience
irregularities in the menstrual cycle, sometimes resulting in infertility,
as well as spontaneous lactation, and in males, breast enlargement
128
can occur. In addition, skin disorders develop ranging from rashes
129
to irreversible pigment discoloration.
Certain blood disorders, most notably dyscrasias, which are
disorders resulting from toxic and/or allergic effects of certain drugs
on the hematologic system, also fall within the non-neurological
130
category.
Agranulocytosis, a life-threatening decrease in infectiondestroying white blood cells, is the most serious blood dyscrasia and is

three percent of another test group experienced akathisia after four
weeks of treatment with a fixed dose of thiothixene.
Cichon, supra note 28, at 302.
121
See Brooks, supra note 102, at 948.
122
Id. at 950. Although approximately two percent of patients who use
neuroleptic medication exhibit symptoms of this disorder out of the thousands
suffering from it, death will result twenty to thirty percent of the time. Id. at 951; see
also Cichon, supra note 28, at 309-10.
123
See Cichon, supra note 28, at 298.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.; see Schmidtlein, supra note 96, at 545.
128
See Cichon, supra note 28, at 298; see also Schmidtlein, supra note 96, at 545.
129
See Cichon, supra note 28, at 298.
130
Id.
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characterized by sore throat, fatigue, fever, jaundice, eye lesions, and
131
skin discoloration.
Clearly, the ‘brutality of these side effects is apparent and it is no
wonder why commentators maintain “‘even acutely disturbed patients
132
might have good reason to refuse these drugs.’”
C. Sell Instructs the Government to Apply Harper before Sell and
This is Unconstitutional Because it Ignores Detainees’ Sixth
Amendment Rights in Favor of a Less Onerous Standard
The Sell four-part test properly addresses Sixth Amendment
concerns incident to the involuntarily administration of antipsychotic
drugs to pre-trial detainees. The Court makes reference to these
concerns, first mentioned in Justice Kennedy’s Riggins concurrence,
in the second prong of the Sell four-part test by stating lower courts
“must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further
those concomitant state interests,” but also it “must find that
administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to
assist counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the
133
trial unfair.”
Specifically, in Riggins, Justice Kennedy devoted eight pages to a
discussion of his skepticism that the state will ever be able to
demonstrate enough justification to allow involuntary medication to
134
detainees to render them competent for trial.
His skepticism is
rooted in the drugs’ brutal side effects and their effects on detainees’
Sixth Amendment rights such as the “right to effective assistance of
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine
witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain
135
silent without penalty for doing so.”
Even though the Sell Court should have discussed further, and
perhaps even expanded on Justice Kennedy’s concerns, this
Comment will assume the Court fully accepted Justice Kennedy’s
131

Id.; see Brooks, supra note 102, at 950.
See Brooks, supra note 102, at 951 (quoting Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294,
1299 (D.N.J. 1979)).
133
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis in original).
134
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A]bsent an
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting
officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines for
purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial . . . .”).
135
Id. at 139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171-72 (1975)).
132
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136

Riggins concurrence in prong two of the Sell standard.
This
endorsement, although cursory, evidences the fact that the Court
recognized these Sixth Amendment concerns and the brutal side
effects of the drugs. What is problematic with Sell, however, is the
Court’s accompanying suggestion that it should first consider
whether involuntary administration of drugs is permissible under
Harper for a dangerous detainee.
The Sell Court’s instruction urging lower courts to apply Harper
before the Sell standard is problematic because it ignores vital Sixth
Amendment concerns. A commentator was quick to question
whether the fact that Harper was in prison after a conviction was a
137
factor the Court took into account in the Harper analysis.
In Sell,
however, there is no mention of criminal conviction being a prerequisite to forcefully administering antipsychotics to detainees
138
under the Harper “dangerousness” grounds.
What was overlooked
with this instruction is that the Harper standard was created for
139
situations involving post-conviction prison inmates.
Obviously, in
those situations, Sixth Amendment fair trial protections are not
implicated anymore. In contrast, individuals like the subjects in Sell
and Riggins are pre-trial detainees, so Sixth Amendment trial
protections still apply, being implicated once post formal initiation of
the adversarial process began.
In Riggins, Justice Kennedy spoke out about these constitutional
140
issues, focusing primarily on the drugs’ inherent risks.
The
136

See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
137
See generally Cichon supra note 28, at 288-89.
138
The record at the federal magistrate’s hearing focused primarily on Sell’s
“dangerousness” and the Court was concerned with the sparse discussion about the
factors articulated in the new four-part test. Id. at 185. Moreover, the Supreme
Court noted problematic the hearing record’s absence of meaningful discussion
about the drugs’ side effects, the drugs’ adverse effects on communication with
counsel, the drugs’ chances of sedating the defendant, and the drugs’ impact on
quelling detainees’ expressive emotions after courtroom trial developments, stating
these concerns tend to undermine the fairness of trial, all of which are
considerations under the new Sell standard. Id. at 185 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. 127 at
142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Additionally, the Court questioned why the lower
court did not address the fact that Sell would not be a threat to the community
because he had already been confined at the Medical Center and will continue to be
held there if he does not take the medication. Sell, 539 U.S. at 186. For these
reasons, the majority vacated and remanded the Eight Circuit’s judgment so the
government could pursue forced medication on either the Sell articulated factors,
the Harper dangerousness grounds, or both. Id.
139
Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.
140
See Ziegelmueller, supra note 88, at 855 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1818
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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defendant’s demeanor, both on the witness stand and at counsel
table, is affected due to the drugs’ side effects, which implicate Sixth
141
Amendment Confrontation Clause arguments.
Further, the side
effects potentially prejudice the accused by interfering with the
142
attorney-client relationship. Justice Kennedy believed that the state
has an interest in synthetically altering the detainee’s competence
level, but if “‘the defendant cannot be tried without his demeanor
being affected in this substantial way by involuntary treatment, in
[his] view the Constitution requires that society bear this cost’” of
143
civil commitment. The Sell standard adopts these views. But clearly,
the Court’s accompanying instruction bypassing these concerns in
favor of a less onerous standard is anathema to detainees’ Sixth
Amendment rights. The Sell Court seemingly overlooked this
important aspect and, therefore, was wrong to instruct governments
to attempt to involuntarily medicate any pre-trial detainee, dangerous
or not, under Harper at all.
The Sell Court should have limited Harper’s application to
dangerous, post-conviction detainees and should have required Sell to
be applied to all pre-trial detainees. Only then can all pre-trial
detainees be guaranteed to have their Sixth Amendment trial rights
weighed against the oftentimes devastating side effects of the drugs
the government is attempting to forcefully administer to them before
they are put on trial for frequently serious charges, even some
punishable by death. To instruct otherwise, as the Sell Court has
done, favors deprivation of mentally ill individuals’ constitutional
rights in favor of achieving an unconstitutional result—an unfair trial,
unfair conviction, and inevitably, an unfair sentence.
CONCLUSION
The involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to
render detainees competent to stand trial is an extremely
144
controversial and troubling issue.
For many years, courts have
141

Id. at 855-56 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). This
is even more important in a capital case where the defendant’s demeanor will affect
the jury’s character assessment in determining whether the defendant lives or dies.
Id.
142
Id. at 856 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
143
Id. (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Justice
Kennedy would allow forced medication “only when the State can show that
involuntary treatment does not cause alterations [in demeanor] . . . .”).
144
See Aaron M. Nance, Comment, Balking at Buying What the Eight Circuit is Selling: United States v. Sell and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, Non-Dangerous,
Pretrial Detainees Cloaked with the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 685, 715
(2003).
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struggled and failed to formulate tests that strike the appropriate
balance between protecting individuals’ rights while respecting the
145
State’s interest in prosecuting defendants.
In Sell, the Court
granted certiorari intending to clear up years of confusion within the
forced medication realm, but in reality, failed because the Court
instructs governments to attempt to involuntarily medicate any pretrial detainee, dangerous or not, under Harper first, before applying
Sell. This instruction favors depriving mentally ill individuals’ Sixth
Amendment rights in favor of achieving an unconstitutional result—
an unfair trial, unfair conviction, and inevitably, an unfair sentence.
The Sell Court should have limited Harper’s application to dangerous,
post-conviction detainees, and should have required Sell to be applied
to all pre-trial detainees—only then can the detainees’ Sixth
Amendment rights be properly accounted for.

145

Id.

Id. at 716. Prior to Sell, then-student (later Professor) Aaron Nance wrote:
Ultimately, the issue of “forced injection” appears to be as novel, and
unsettled, as it was a decade ago when the Supreme Court handed
down the enigma of Riggins v. Nevada. The Court will have to take a
“forced injection” case at some point, which may be sooner rather than
later, and only then will we know whether sacrificing a defendant’s
individual rights in the name of criminal justice is worth the price of all
the new, and possibly more difficult, legal questions that practice
naturally generates.

